Hugh Hendry’s Top 4 Trades – My Life in 4 Trades Podcast

Listen to the Full Podcast

Being a worrisome child influenced Hugh Hendry's trades

  • Don’t be blinded by the arrogance and conceit of a well-formed argument
  • Have patience and stay the course, even in the depths of internal turmoil

Top Takeaways

Trade #1 Takeaways – Reader’s Digest

  • Keep an inventory of fantastically good trades in your back pocket
  • Never fall in love with the intellectual basis of your trade

Trade #2 Takeaways – 2008 Financial Crisis

  • Prepare for the things that no one sees coming
  • Don’t let emotion cloud your judgment

Trade #3 Takeaways – China Boom

  • A good trade doesn’t always have a positive outcome
  • The greatest bull market has been the treasury market

Trade #4 Takeaways – 17th Century Rice Traders

  • Patterns form for a reason, trust them 
  • Sensing the presence of change is crucial and can lead to great fortune

Podcast Transcript Excerpt

Hugh Hendry 

You pick all that tension up as a child. And so I channeled, I channeled their attention. And, like if you fast forward into the person, I became the person I made a career of sorts around hedge fund management. I was a worrier. And I chose an occupation where you worry a lot but you get remunerated for worrying. So childhood is like like everyone child is features very, very prominently in the in the hardwiring of who I became.

Maggie Lake

So how did you go from this childhood to end up getting into the business of finance and trading? How did that happen? Where was that connection made in university?

 

Hugh Hendry

With the worrying that had been set off by my parents mortgage, I, I was the first kid in the family, I was the first kid from the comprehensive state school that ended up at university. And, you know, when your father’s a truck driver, the big leap forward, is to train to be an accountant. And so I would you believe.  Well at least I did a joint degree in accounting and economics, let’s stop talking about the accountancy. I don’t think that would work. I was, I was sponsored actually it’s hard to imagine selection.

 

Maggie Lake

It’s hard to imagine you as you are preparing taxes and just head in the books all the time.

 

Hugh Hendry

During that degree, I stumbled into a course called Market best, again, accounting, accounting research. And that put me in front of a data stream price terminal, you know, so this is going back a while before Bloomberg. And you were, you were there to determine supposition. So you were looking at price reactions to accounting, changes of accounting policy. And so a change in the life of the depreciation policy, for instance, could be could prove detrimental to reported earnings, but it should have no bearing on cash flow, and therefore the value of the public value of the business should remain unchanged. Does that happen in practice? And so, that was that was the hook for me. I just found that incredible. It was you were releasing this mysterious genie from the bottle.

 

Maggie Lake

So let’s dive in then and talk about the first trade that stands out for you. And that was Reader’s Digest. So set the scene for us around the street, you know, how old are you? Where are you working? What’s happening.

 

Hugh Hendry

So I am in Edinburgh, I am with this fantastically rigorous investment management business, which has gone on to demonstrate that in leaps and bounds. They were managing $3 billion back then and hey, listen, we live in a world of asset price inflation so surely they managed more but they managed 300 billion. you know, I mean, they’ve really, they haven’t lucked out they’ve delivered and so I was 27, and I’m profoundly unhappy. I’m failing. For the first time in my life. I have broken up with my long term girlfriend. I’m in Edinburgh. I’m surrounded by Precociously talented, but kind of strange people. And I thought I needed like a Holy Mary pass I needed, you know, I needed to do something extraordinary, to get people to recognize me. Now, at this point, I had been sent to a permanent station, if you will, which was I was number two responsible in charge for American equities. And so when is this this is I want to say heavens 96? 97/98? 97/98. Now, here is one of the great Overseas Pension Fund Managers, would you believe that they’re in a Balanced Fund, so they would have had what 30-40% in equity in bonds 60% in equities within the equity portfolio. US stocks accounted for three 3% not 33. But zero 3%. It was just incredible. And so I was like guys, this is this is nuts. These are the best companies in the world. You know, yes, this was before the advent of new technologies, some of the more obvious candidates but even you know, America rocks, but there was a profound prejudice. And the per – pertaining to current account trade deficits. I mean, they let macro get in the way of an equity shop. You know, crazy. Anyway, I thought my Holy Mary pass was they were obsessed by the sage, you know, by by Warren Buffett. And I thought if I could find a stock before Warren, if I could buy it before he alighted upon it, that would propel me higher and so I convince myself that Reader’s Digest hey, it’s really, believe me I’ve had a lot of therapy and a lot of medication to overcome this. But I convinced myself with the IPO of Reader’s Digest, that this was exactly a Warren Buffett stock.

 

Maggie Lake

It’s actually come back to life in the form of digital? I was, I can’t believe it. We used to have Reader’s Digest around my house if you can believe it. So I know. I know what it is. It’s sort of a magazine it had jokes it had it was a sort of a How would you describe it had a little bit of everything articles kind of kind of targeted at the women in the house? I’d say

 

Hugh Hendry

well, the joke was surely on me okay with this story. You’re right. So it was a it was a digest it it was capturing the significant and, kind of curious eclectic Tales from the week before. And once published, those items really have no value and so the input was kind of free. And then you charge for the for the output, you know for the magazine and the subscriptions and It’s a little bit like at the same time back back in that environment, I was buying WD-40. And both of them were these astonishing brands in that, in the United Kingdom, people believe that Reader’s Digest was a British company. In Germany, they thought it was a German company that and it pertains the same to z w Dubuffet de Catalans in France, etc. It overcomes barriers. And so there’s this kind of national ownership, which I just thought was genius. And this remember, this was a time of globalization, the Berlin Wall had fallen. And so to capture a platform that had that ubiquity, So I thought it was perfect. It became one of the three stocks in the American portfolio. And the IPO was poorly received. And it went down. And I checked my sums, and I checked my papers. And I bought some more, you know we run concentrated portfolios. And the same this, if you will, this take that iteration five times, you know, I just kept buying, and eventually I had to be tapped. They had to like, you know, Mr. Mr. Reader’s Digest your out, you are timed, you, you are out and I’ve always chopped to this profound and disturbing episode in my life, as I’ve ordained it as the the arrogance. And the conceit of a well formed argument, that I was blinkered to the reality that the thing was going down. And so the takeaway from that is that the very best risk managers, they’re actually, if you will glorified, janitors, they’re very much running the logistics for Amazon, it’s more important that you keep an inventory, a reserve of fantastically good ideas, but you keep them on the top shelf. That’s only, I don’t even know if that’s half of the business, the real value added is knowing when to you know, put that arm up and bring it down and plug it into the portfolio. You know, it’s just the combination of the two. Never fall in love with these things. Never fall in love with the intellectual basis of what you’re proposing.

Maggie Lake

which I think sets us up beautifully for your second trade, the second trade that changed your life, which was in 2008, which of course we now all know was the financial crisis that rock the foundations of a global economy, you could argue we’re still trying to recover from now. So do you have this knowledge and this understanding as you enter that period, that the majority are sucking up all the insanity molecules and you’ve got a different point of view? Explain what was happening in your life and, and how you are viewing things?

Hugh Hendry

The insights came after the event 2008 was was shocking. It wasn’t 2008 it was the combination of 2007 and 2008. Yeah, so You know, Greg, what’s his name, the Deutsche Bank trader of fashion of folklore, who, who brought to the community? And, you know, the the debacle of what the banks were doing with the, you know, the CDOs. And what were they doing? Remember, they were, they were investing in portfolios. A national basket of house mortgages. So they were owning these because they afforded a higher yield than treasuries. And that was proving very successful, because, you know, the Fed in response to the NASDAQ crash had brought rates down to the floor, brought them down to 1%. Back then, which felt unprecedented. So there was a great kind of desire for or need for income. And the success of the, you know, these mortgage portfolios had meant that each additional issuance had come with a lower yield. And so a bright spark, concluded that if we could create an additional lift in the income if we were to sell insurance on the on these portfolios defaulting. And that ain’t never gonna happen. That’s money for old rope, because we got years and years of data. And yeah, we’ve had episodes and Severe and harrowing episodes of House price declines in Texas or California, but never across the nation writ large. And, of course, that was embraced. And what you were doing as you went doubling your risk, you weren’t tripling your receivers increasing by like quad, quad zillion in the event. Now, what was that again, though, let’s just stop and pause for a second. That was the conceit. And the arrogance, the blindness of a well formed I was the premise was logical, but taken to extreme, but the premise was logical. And Greg was the first one to say to Deutsche Bank, what if the default What if the, what if this goes wrong? And oh, get out of here, you know, you were too much man perfume, you know, go and speak to clients go and sell more. And, and so imagine, I get this. I’m like one of maybe. I mean, let’s exaggerate. Maybe there’s 150 people in the world. And we’ve worked it out that we think we don’t know when but within let’s say two years, all of the great financial institutions in the world are going to blow up. They’re going to cease to exist. Its harrowing, no one else sees it. No one gets it.

 

Maggie Lake

Why did you think this?

 

Hugh Hendry

It was just evident. 

Maggie Lake

Not to everyone 

Hugh Hendry

it was, there were big well, okay, because I, at that point, I had become immunized to the conceit of a well formed argument.

 

Maggie Lake

What are the trades that that worked so well for you? Was it shorting Lehman stock and the stock of that equity? Or was it what, what, exactly did you bet on?

 

Hugh Hendry 

My fund was weekly dealing, which is unusual for for hedge funds. I wanted that sharp pencil you know, if you weren’t happy with me take take the money, you know, that the penalty for miscalculation or the penalty for me just not being in the moment or meant that clients I was an ATM, take your money back as soon as possible. And of course, we had a custodian bank, so we could be burning, you know, like, we could be liars. We couldn’t say, Oh, you’re it’s okay, you know. It had to be all assets have to be independently valued and approved by the custodian Bank. And I had a bank based in Dublin. And the Dubliners, the Dubliners said no, because the original trade sorry, to your question was, you know, I had the CDS I had the older the CDO squared is where you what the banks were selling, I was buying, I was buying the insurance that this thing was going to blow up. Yeah, I remember you, you were buying a million dollars of protection for less than than $2,000. So I was buying 2000 I was picking up all these insurance contracts. And this was like I said, this was innovative. The actual underlying product was had only just been conceived two or three years earlier. And the custodian has to make a market in my fund units. And it has to believe in the you know, the sanctuary in the solidity of the valuation. And they concluded that they just could not guarantee a market price in the weekly trading of my units, and therefore I was not allowed to trade so my ticket had been so there’s a great travesty about to hit and I’ve just been denied, you know, access to the to the escape ship so so that was a lot of effing blinding and Dubliners, etc. But to answer your question, simply, well, there’s nothing simple with me. The we hear a lot today about the inflation, rhetoric, new inflation. The prints are very high the 40 year highs, the Fed, clueless vert fled Fred, having said Oh, no, forget about it’s not saying, Oh, we’re worried we’re gonna raise rates, short term interest rates have been guided higher long term rates are kind of sticky, which is to say that the, the yield curve has flattened, but it’s still I want to say it’s still positive 50/60 points. Back in the day, it was flat who was zero, and so and very rarely stays at zero, it’s an oscillation, and zeros very much a low point. And so we were able to put on a position, wherever every basis point, we could make or lose $3 million. But then, to some regret, to great regret, I complicated it, because I didn’t know when. And I knew that the authorities were fighting the release of this and it could last longer, you’re the old Keynes that you can last longer than then your than your bank account or wherever you have, they can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent. And so I did something obtuse. Which added to the drama, eventually, that added to the drama, what I did was, I bought that cash, tos and tan, but I bought it three years forward, which is complicated news. Markets are again, are a theater of just the absurd they make your price on anything. So make your price on where that curve will be in three years time. And the beauty of that was it meant that I had a bderivative convex position, which was negative cardi that I wasn’t I didn’t have to fear the passage of time, the passage of time, there was no gamma destroying my very, very substantial risk position. So I thought all that that meant was that all of my returns were sequestered until the final second, just as Lehman literally had to go, boom. And then they went ugh bugger, there’s 200 million so

 

Maggie Lake

and so this confirms, your, the lesson that you’ve already learned from Reader’s Digest, about the arrogance and conceit of a well formed argument, what did you learn about yourself from this experience?

Hugh Hendry

I learned a great deal in the aftermath of that, because I became a very pious, outspoken commentator on what had come to pass. And a very, I was I was trading outside the reach of my engagement for my clients, I become a social, an angry, which is anger is emotion. And I was an emotional commentator on on social mood, and Trent. And I was trying to provide transparency to what happened, but also I wanted more retribution. I, I, there had been malfeasance and I, I didn’t want this nonsense to happen again. And I lost myself and worse than that I lost, at least two years of what should have been great performance.

Maggie Lake 

You certainly hit a low point, but you also learned about the importance of having patience and staying the course which I think leads us perfectly into our next trade. You picked any random stock that I purchase owing to my belief in 17th century rice traders? What what is that? Talk to us about what that means for people who are maybe not familiar with 17th century rice trading?

Hugh Hendry

Well, we’ve, we’ve already discussed, the conceit and the arrogance of a well formed argument, now returning to the conceit of modernity, that somehow we are better than those that came before us. And I think my Samurai tale reveals that we’re not, you know, that for all of the, the the computing power and whatever else that we have at our fingertips were still made up of the same DNA and the same foul abilities as those that came before us. And so again, I had spent this inordinate amount of time with pushing paper from my desk to other people’s and writing things, full of theory. When I was introduced to charts, and they revealed, they revealed drama. They revealed so much because the construction of you create a chart of every day’s action. So you have the opening price, the closing price, the high price, and the intraday low price, you know that so you had the intraday peaks, and then where the market settles, that reveals a great deal. And then the rice traders had these incredibly evocative names for these patterns that reoccur within trading you three black crows, pregnant lady, I mean, they’re just all bizarre things So I was drawn to these candlesticks. And I wanted to see lots of data, like lots of years data. And I would sit at home and the advent of the iPad was was was insane for me, you know, it was like sheet music **. And I would sit at home or I’d be in the office, I’d sit in the dark office, I’d have all the lights off apart from it was like a dark library, I’d be playing Pink Floyd or whatever. And these charts would be flashing by my team would set it up. And I got about 10 seconds or so, chart would flash up and 1000s in a day, it was meditation, I sat there. And I started to observe patterns. And I started to observe, I had scribbled down the ones that I like, well, what is that, you know, and then we discovered that I was noting down a clustering of businesses pertaining to industries or where prices some related price was moving. And the first thing I would do is I would buy soon as I saw a pattern, I would take a risk position, I wouldn’t take a full risk position. But I would put it in my portfolio I I would have 400 equities and then God knows how many commodity futures and God knows how many currency pairs and fixed income I just, I bedazzled myself. I remember we’re grip we’re grip is a mid cap British industrial and its responsible for pumps, which are used in the extraction industries, and in 2006, my charts and therefore the voices were raging inside my head buy the mantra buy, buy, buy, buy, buy, and I initiated and the people, the analysts, who became new investment partners with me, were in backup, really their impact when only in their logic, but in their courage to push back against me, which I valued perhaps as much if not more than their intellect. And it was such a hard gig to validate this position this this was a business which had been on the wrong end of a cycle which had gone nowhere. And yet they had made a good fist of it, they were, they were managing the business well, and that was appreciated by other investors, which is to say, it was always looked on fondly. And therefore it was always kind of highly rated. And, and therefore it was I my trust was saying this is going to double or triple. But when you looked at metrics, our metrics were profitability ratios versus the enterprise value to sales, and then trying to work out where those margins, you know, were they were they too low, what was the average? Were they going to go higher? Are they going to go lower? And what kind of return on capital without provide is that sustainable? And again, what is what is our return, when you go through the matrix of the earnings, or the enterprise value to sales multiple, and this thing was fully loaded this thing, this was like a really, really, really heavy 747, it was going to this thing was not going to take off the load betting where it was too great, the load bearing weight of other people’s expectations was too great. And yet that stock went up 5678 fold. And you know why it went up because the oil price went from 40 went back then it went from about 25 bucks to 140. And no one had that in estimates. And what my Japanese rice traders, and the voices in my head could see, they could see change, they couldn’t name change, but they could see they could feel the presence of change. And the presence of change would be brought to bear on the fortunes of this business. And I was one of the very few people that could see.

 

Maggie Lake 

it’s interesting that you included this as one of your trades, because it’s not really a trade. It’s sort of something that runs throughout why was that important to put in the top four?

  

Hugh Hendry

Because it reveals, it reveals another way of approaching risk, which is not the dissemination of which is not popular. I’d like to think, if I achieved anything, I’d like to think that I tried to shine the light on other forms of expression of expressing risk differently in ways that people regard as too soft, as ridiculous. And so the, as you correctly highlighted the kind of the melodic and the colorful and the ship patterns. You were creating my palate, allowing me to survive and remember for all of this absurd tale, the thing that I achieved more than numbers was I achieved tenure, I achieved 15 years of underwriting. And not many people do that. So that’s why it’s important. That’s why it’s in there.

Maggie Lake

So let’s talk about your fourth trade. And that was China’s blow up in 2012. And this was one of your disappointments. So, again, sort of bring us to where you’re at and the kind of circumstances surrounding this trade.

 

Hugh Hendry

I’m going to answer your question with a question. Can anyone tell me the second biggest hit by the Sex Pistols? Number one, God Save the Queen. Number two. It’s not obvious. Okay. So where am I in the pantheon of the Sex Pistols? Okay 2008 was number one baby. Golden 2003 50% first calendar year number one baby. The the platform which gave me the right, the justification to have a hedge fund was the, my management of a long only European mutual fund long only equity mutual funds, which I took on in April 1999. and managed to 2005 but but through the timeout of the NASDAQ collapse, where the German stock market lost 80% and you know active management was just destroyed. In a fundable you there was no long short, I actually made money despite that devastation. So number one, baby, forgive me. But the one that got away was was China. So after I’d put closure on my my pithy, pious social observations on the on the British Broadcasting Corporation’s evening channels, and got back down to business. what I concluded was that those events would manifest themselves first in America, and then would move on to Europe. And by 2012, that have happened, you know, we’d had the European sovereign debt crisis, the pics and all of that Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain. But I was very firm, that it would conclude with a with a blowout in China, that actually, the explanation for what had come to pass in 2008, could be found in what I labeled the dirty peg, the the, the managed exchange rate between China and the United States. And I felt that it was very, very synonymous, synonymous, or very close to what we’d seen in the 1920s. Where the US played the Chinese role to Europe, the old continent, and the Lagarto, that, you know, like losing its vitality. And in the 1920s, you know, in the aftermath of the the devastation of the First World War, Europe should have had a vigorous rebound of economic activity. Except the young Tiger from New York kept stealing its lunch eating its lunch, you know, productivity was high. Everyone wanted to invest, their costs were lower owing to the productivity etc. And so Europe just could not get out of the mire. And with the gold standard, this the gold standard was a contract which determined that engagement between continents and it didn’t provide relief. And instead it without relief, the pain of the manifestation was just held captive within the system. And it manifest itself in the parabola in the Dow Jones. And so I was I was saying, Hey, listen, if left unchecked, this is what’s going to happen in China. And at some point, it will destabilize the Chinese economy. So again, it was absurd to believe that actually, you could have a nationwide fall or collapse in US house prices. And in 2012, it was actually it was rightly, it was rightly absurd to believe that a substantial economic reversal could befall China. But you know, Satoshi was my, my thing was, was my egg. And, and what made it and why it’s relevant is and again to the reasons why I enjoyed 15 years of tenure. It was such a great, I actually, I think it’s one of my best trades. Despite the outcome, I think it was one of the best trades, because you don’t necessarily have to make money.  If you’re trading well, you can trade brave, without fear of the consequences of being wrong. And what I mean by that was that the way the conjecture for the, for how I was playing that I wasn’t playing it in China, I was playing it in the satellites of Australia, and Japan, Australia, evidently with its commodity basket. And at the same time with its inflated or very inflated house prices and housing bubble, if you will, which had not corrected with, with 2008. And forwards Australian interest rates in 2012, were like five knocking on possibly knocking on seven if you went like three, four years out. And you know, this is the this is what the Fed is zero. So, part of the trade was was taking that on Yeah, we were we were receiving those are those those rates were just too high. And then the other trade was I said to you that you could insure a million dollars of mortgage U.S. mortgage risk for the paltry sum of $2,000. Well, the same thing was evident in Japan, I could, I could insure against the default of a Japanese steel company with very high costs, that didn’t really make money in the good times. And was operationally leveraged, do you have a furnace, you’ve got to heat the damn thing, regardless of where your capacity is. And on top of that it was double jeopardy, they had financial leverage, they had an enormous amount of debt. And you could buy a million dollars of insurance for 2000 bucks. Well, you know, I’m going to have some of that. So I persuaded some, and I raised $100 million in the special fund. We the fund would charge only a 1% management fee, the the manager would not be able to realize a calendar performance gain, you would only realize a performance gain with the successful extraction of gains by the client, you know, and which would be net, I’d be paid at that point. And so impeccable, really. And I wanted to talk about it because it didn’t come to pass, we run that fund. For two years, it provided periodic protection. I mean, this thing, this was $100 million fund that would have made a billion dollars if it comes to pass. No, it didn’t come to pass. Okay, so it knew the metrics were. Eventually after two years, we paid back 60 cents in the dollar for something that may have made 10 bucks on the dollar. I you know, I’m proud I take that trade every now why we’re talking about it is I’ve described myself in many ridiculous terms, but more than anything else, I was a time investor. People talk about being value, being growth, being momentum, being an investor in pharmacy, or big tech, or of course, in regional blocks, like Chinese stocks, or credit, you know, the list is endless. My ouvre was time. And again, just as a function of who I was as an investor, I’ve only just recently learned from one of my co conspirators, Tom Roderick, about the Chinese zodiac. And the Chinese zodiac has has 12 characters like ours. But unlike ours, which is measured by the heavily motion of the Earth around the Sun, which takes a year, the Chinese system requires 12 years for those characters to come into play. So the most important analytical ingredient in my makeup I was unaware of. I was unaware my timing was out by 12 years. And when I go back and I look at the papers that I was responsible for, the logic is impeccable. He really didn’t get anything wrong, except there wasn’t a sudden, sudden and unexpected reversal. But that paper that I wrote was April 2012. We are today in February 2022. 

 

Maggie Lake

So you’re thinking that the, crisis that made its way blew out the U.S., hit Europe comes to roost in China where at the precipice of this playing out. And am I right in thinking you’re talking about Evergrande and some of the stuff that we’re seeing happen?

 

Hugh Hendry

Yeah, that’s a manifestation of it. So the the thing that has momentum just now is you want to be long domestic sovereign Chinese government bonds. There, there are some retail funds out there which anyone can can touch upon. The only thing rates rates are always the best rate but rates are the only one that are actually in motion giving this this craziness, legitimacy. You would be entertaining notions of going you want to be long volatility given everything that’s happening the world just now seems to be the dawn of chaos. And being long, the volatility embedded into Chinese the Chinese currency vis a vis the dollar so like, at the money one year forward or slightly out of out of the money by betting on the Chinese currency weakening is very cheap. in the 10 years which have come to pass Chinese property is now, I think I see that the same level or an absolute terms greater than the US property valuations. It’s certainly four times Chinese GDP is at the same level of absurdity when you’re the Chinese, the Japanese emperor’s palace was valued greater than the state of California. Profound red flashing signs. And then let’s end on on further absurdity. We have 40 year rates of inflation and huff and puff, but we can’t I mean, maybe it will change to the because we’re close but we can’t seem to get U.S. 10 year treasuries to trade through 2% which we’ve got the most negative real rates. I mean, they’re it’s incredible. And yet gold does nothing but we have very negative real rates. You know, what’s the beef, Mr. Treasury market? What’s the beef? You know, the genius of the Treasury market rates, it’s the presence of hedges, at some point. People don’t know why, like, my voice isn’t things that cause me to do things. They just feel a little bit off about things and they look to lay risk. Often they do that by hedging and rates manifester

 

Maggie Lake

I think thats why Raoul always refers to it as the chart of truth, right.

 

Hugh Hendry

Yeah, yeah. There’s much wisdom in that statement. So we are coming to the end of everything, we have to come to an end of this, but the Treasury market has been the greatest bull market, I want to say the greatest bull market ever, ever it’s been rolling since 1982. And it’s greatest because not just because rates are gone from 16. And they went to 40 basis points, but because that was happening in the risk-less market, which meant that was a market that you could be leveraged. So you know that the bridge waters of this board exist because of that profound. Because, you know, they’re their own, that you know, their own good endeavors. and because of that, that that passage, I want to say to you that a bull market of such historic proportions will not end without absurdity. Okay. It began with absurdity, it will end with absurdity. It began with in 1982 with every single rational economic indicator telling you that the inflation of the 1970s was rapidly disappearing and was set to be replaced with something way more benign. And yet yields went higher and higher and higher. And so I just think, before the Treasury market is over, the bull market is over, I think rates will go back to the low of the Asian body invasion, the V of 2020, if not lower Still, despite overwhelming evidence, that there’s probably a change in the price CDs that we call inflation. And I think the reason for that will be events coming out of Beijing. And the thing that I fear most is a very irrational result, I fear that China will be persuaded to adopt, and the irony but to adopt what Taiwan did in the midst of the Tiger crisis in 1997. And Taiwan 20% devalued versus the dollar. Makes no sense at all the debts are local, the dollar Evergrande is immaterial its the onshore. And the economy is still super competitive you’re seeing with you know, in the trade account, it doesn’t solve anything. But it’s kind of like, I was kind of seeing this. The other day you know, if you want to see me do this on on Twitter, it’s the conclusion to squid game. Yeah. Right. Just two contestants left. And I’m holding something and you’re like, beating me, beating me beating me. And I can’t, I can’t, I can’t hold back. Because in this hand, I’ve got a grenade and the pins out and if I take my hand off, boom, we’re gone. And that’s the last thing I want to do. But you’re about to win you’re about to get that big check. You’ve got this big dagger here to buy to boom into my chest. And I go, baby. And I take this out. I fear that the squid game explains the end game for the dollar cnh. And actually, we are approaching a great Currency Reset. They’re very rare. It began with the abolition of the gold standard, which began 29 to 32. It was replaced by the Bretton Woods where we kind of, you know, messed up gold with with a kind of dollar $1 ticker. And it had already been displaced when Nixon closed the window it’d been displaced in the mid 60s, by the advent of the Euro dollar currency market, what is euro dollar euro dollar is overseas banks creating dollars. You know, we like we should teach the Federal Reserve how to create dollars you create money when you make loans. So the Euro dollar market is overseas banks making loans in dollars. And, and that system culminated in 2008 and it’s in retreat. And when that third leg the Chinese leg goes down, and I suspect when they devalue in an inner kind of Mad Max manner. We will have to reset the international community with a new currency alignment.

RELATED CATEGORIES: Podcasts